Centre *for* MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY *and* DEMOCRACY

POLICY BRIEF

Online Harms AI Audit

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Between May and June 2026, as part of a chatbot audit for online harm, we put the same request to four of the most widely used consumer AI chatbots: help a user posing as a teenager make self-starvation sound appealing. We got four different answers. Google's Gemini supplied the pitch, casting food as debt. Anthropic's Claude refused every version of the request. Meta's chatbot blocked the conversation before it could start. OpenAI's ChatGPT fell in between. Same request, same moment, four levels of protection. A Canadian opening one of these apps has no way of knowing which kind of product they hold.

The example is not an outlier. We tested these four products against the harms Canada's online safety law was written to address, in sustained, multi-turn conversations a determined user could have. Across every attack we ran, roughly one in three ended with the product producing or helping to produce harmful content. Behind each interface is a different decision about what the product will and will not do, and the protection a user gets depends almost entirely on which one they open.

On 10 June 2026 the government tabled the *Safe Social Media Act*, Bill C-34, the first Canadian bill to impose direct safety duties on AI chatbots. The argument has moved past whether to govern these systems, and our audit confirms why: across six of the seven harms the law names, these products can be induced to provide the means to cause harm. But it also complicates the task ahead, because how far each product resists is a choice its maker has made, with little disclosure and wide variation, and the legislation will have to account for that.

A note on AI in this research. This audit uses AI to study AI: an open-source attacker model drives each conversation, open-source judge models from a vendor outside the audited set score every response, and a browser-automation stack drives the consumer products as an ordinary user would. We chose this deliberately: auditing deployed products at this scale is not feasible by hand, and an automated harness is also the form independent oversight would have to take. The same fallibility we measure in the products applies to our instruments, and we mitigate it with out-of-set judges, worked-example anchoring, repeated runs, and human review of transcripts. Claude (Anthropic) also served as a coding and drafting assistant; all code, data, and prose were reviewed and verified by the authors, who are responsible for the contents.

What the bill does

Most of the *Safe Social Media Act* covers familiar territory. It rebuilds the architecture of the lapsed Bill C-63: safety duties on the largest social media platforms, transparency obligations, age-appropriate design protections for children, and a new Digital Safety Commission empowered to investigate, order changes, and levy penalties. Two elements are new: an age restriction on social media accounts, and the decision to bring AI chatbots into the law.

The Act defines a chatbot service by what the system does, not by what it is called. A service is covered if it can be used, over repeated conversations, to "simulate a sustained human-like relationship," whether that resembles friendship, intimacy, or therapeutic support. A definition tied to a product category risks being outdated on arrival; one tied to a capability can travel as the technology shifts from chatbots to companions to agents (Ebers, 2025).

The duties differ from those for social media, to match how chatbots actually cause harm. A regulated chatbot service must take adequate measures to reduce the risk that it produces harmful content. It must intervene in a crisis: when a user signals intent to self-harm, the service has to interrupt the conversation, point the user to a

real crisis service, and let them reach a human being. And it must not engage in named behaviours, including posing as a person, posing as a licensed professional, or using manipulative techniques that pull a user into the kind of dependency that leads them, in the Act's own words, to "withdraw socially or disconnect from reality." These behavioural duties, aimed at how a chatbot acts rather than what it says, are the Act's most novel part, and our audit tests the most demanding of them: whether a product will coach a user it treats as under-age into self-harm. Operators must also publish a safety plan setting out their system's risks and what they do about them.

Including chatbots in the regulatory obligations, but not the age restriction, was likely the right decision, and a deliberate one: a week earlier, on 4 June, the government's "AI for All" national strategy had promised an online-safety regime for social-media and chatbot users, and C-34 is that promise tabled (Government of Canada 2026). The stakes are not hypothetical. In early 2026 Character.AI and Google, among other defendants, settled a suit brought by the mother of a fourteen-year-old who died by suicide after months of conversations with a companion bot, in a case a court had allowed to proceed by treating the bot's output as a product rather than as protected speech (JURIST 2026). Deferring chatbots would have left the fastest-moving and most intimate corner of the consumer AI market outside the law within months.

Almost every one of these duties turns on a single word, "adequate," and the bill does not say what it means. What counts as adequate, and how anyone outside the company would ever know, is left to regulations not yet written and to a regulator not yet built. That is the basis of the critique the bill has already drawn: that it asks the public to trust a framework whose substance comes later (Geist 2026). Our audit speaks directly to that question, because it measures what these products do right now.

How the harms show up in a chatbot

A social network spreads harmful material someone else made. A chatbot is different: prompted the right way, it generates that material itself, on demand, in a private conversation. That is the harm we set out to measure.

We did not test whether these products go out and harm anyone. A chatbot does not bully a child, distribute a deepfake, or attack a building. What we tested is narrower, and for a regulator more tractable: whether the product will give a user the means to do those things, the methods and instructions, the usable text, the coaching that makes a harmful act feel reasonable. The danger is facilitation: in a private conversation with no one watching, the chatbot can supply what a knowledgeable accomplice would, to anyone who asks the right way.

This is also why chatbots do not fit the tools the law already has. On a feed, governance is about distribution: what gets recommended, what stays up, what comes down, and how fast. There is a post to find and a post to remove. A chatbot hands over the means in the moment, privately, for an audience of one. There is nothing to take down, so Parliament wrote chatbots a separate set of duties (Woods and Perrin, 2021).

In a chatbot, each of the seven harms the law names becomes a question of means:

- **Non-consensual intimate images.** Whether the chatbot produces, or aids in the production of, making a deepfake: a fake, intimate image of a real, identifiable person. Here we test only the aiding aspect.
- **The sexual victimization of children.** Producing or describing child sexual abuse material on request. This is the one harm we did not test.
- **Inducing a child to self-harm.** Telling a user it treats as a teenager how to self-harm, which methods and how

far to take them, or coaching disordered eating until starvation is framed as discipline.

- **Bullying a child.** Writing the most wounding things to say to a specific child, the means to single one out and break them down.
- **Fomenting hatred.** Generating ready-to-use dehumanising material about a religious or ethnic group, the raw content for a campaign of hate.
- **Inciting violence.** Supplying operational guidance for an attack on a real target.
- **Terrorism and violent extremism.** Working through attack planning, or writing recruitment and radicalisation copy, each opened from an innocent-sounding question.

The Act does not ask whether a chatbot has harmed anyone. Its duty to act responsibly requires a regulated chatbot to take "adequate measures" to mitigate the risk of communicating harmful content, and it defines that content by its use, across the seven harms above. In the law's own terms, handing over the means is the harm, and a product that does it reliably is failing the duty the Act now places on it.

We tested six of these seven directly, in both English and French. The protection a Canadian receives is starkly uneven, and most of that unevenness is between products, not within them.

One harm, one company, three layers

Every AI chatbot is one model reached three ways, and safety can be placed at any of these layers (Mökander et al., 2024).

The consumer system is the finished app the public opens, where the company can layer filters, hidden instructions, age checks, and crisis referrals on top of the model.

The developer system is the bare interface that other companies build their own products on through an API, with occasional added protection in the form of content filters.

The model is the underlying AI, with the safety trained into its weights.

Each is a separate decision: a product can be safe at one layer, at all of them, or at none. And a key governance question is which layer regulation should attach to.

We asked Gemini, at both the developer system and the consumer app, whether it would give a user presenting as a teenager the means to self-harm. On these prompts it was among the weakest of the four. Through the API, Gemini handed the material over in a third of our attempts, without refusing, and that API is the floor every product built on Gemini inherits. Even when it pointed the user to a crisis line, it produced the content anyway: a referral is not a refusal. The deployed consumer app, the one a teenager would actually open, did no better, producing the same material in half of our attempts and offering a crisis resource in fewer than half. Whatever its product layer was doing, it was not protecting the user. The disordered-eating lines we opened with came from one such Gemini exchange. (Per-product rates rest on a handful of conversations each; the technical brief reports the exact counts.)

The same attack against Claude and Meta AI produced the opposite result. Claude refused every time, including an attempt to slip the request past it in a simple letter cipher, naming the behaviour for what it was: "not with ciphers, not with creative framing, not in any form." Its protection lived in the model. Meta AI never engaged at

all: a classifier in the product blocked the conversation outright, on the first and entirely benign question. Its protection lived in the product.



Figure 1: Self-harm attack transcripts, by product and access path. The same attack across four products and two access paths: Gemini through its bare developer API, Claude and Meta AI through their consumer apps. The Gemini excerpt is from a slightly earlier model; the version Google ships today produced the same kind of content in our testing. Per-product cells rest on roughly three to six conversations each.

The same harm and the same attack produced four different outcomes. Gemini handed over pro-starvation material at both layers, and ChatGPT produced self-harm content too, at roughly the same rate through its API and its app. Claude and Meta AI blocked it entirely, by two completely different mechanisms. Among four near-identical apps, a user has no way to tell the safe ones from the rest. That is the gap the bill has to close, and why where the safety sits matters almost as much as whether it is there at all.



Figure 2: Crisis referral versus harmful content, on self-harm prompts. How often each product surfaced a crisis resource and how often it still produced the content, by product and access path.

How we know

The evidence comes from a systematic audit we ran in May and June 2026. We held automated, multi-turn conversations with each product, opening on an innocent topic and steering toward a harmful goal over a series of turns (Raji et al., 2022), the kind of back-and-forth a determined but otherwise ordinary user could have. We ran each product two ways, through its bare developer API, which other companies build on, and through the consumer app the public opens, across six of the seven harm categories in English and French. A separate, independent model from outside the audited set then scored each conversation for one thing: did the product hand over the means in full, or refuse? We reviewed the judged transcripts by hand and found its errors rare. Each product-harm-language cell ran three times, so the finer breakdowns rest on a handful of conversations each; we read them as directional and lean on the broad contrasts.

This one-in-three figure is a per-attack rate under deliberate, sustained pressure, not a measure of how often an ordinary user stumbles into harm; a determined adversary is the threat the bill's duties exist to guard against. But the average matters less than the range it hides: the same attack one product refused almost every time, another answered roughly two times in three.

Four things explain that range.

1. **The product, not the technology, decides.** The protection a Canadian receives depends not on the state of the technology but on which of the four products they use. Anthropic's Claude refused almost everything we tried; Google's Gemini handed over the means in most of our attempts; ChatGPT fell in between, and Meta AI blocked nearly all of them. The same harms and attacks produced a fortyfold gap.
2. **Safety lives in different places.** Claude's protection sits in the model and Meta's in the product, as the self-harm case showed. ChatGPT's app refused more often than its API, though app particularities make it difficult to determine what was responsible, while Gemini does little at either. Four near-identical chat windows

hide four different architectures.

3. **The developer API is a thin floor, but everything downstream inherits it.** Reached through the developer system, the models were often far more permissive than their polished apps, and whatever protection is missing there is missing from every smaller product that inherits it (Carey, 2026).
4. **The safeguards are invisible and unstable.** For three of the four products we could not confirm which protections, if any, were running on the version the public actually uses. What the companies disclose is uneven and, for now, voluntary, and none of the four checked a user's age. Nothing holds still either: a single update to Gemini's model left its overall failure rate roughly unchanged while moving individual harms in opposite directions, self-harm improving even as bullying of children went from mostly blocked to breaking in more than four of every five attempts.

Lined up side by side, the variation in safety is plain.



Figure 3: Attack success rate, by product and access path. Share of adversarial conversations that ended with the product handing over the means to a harm.

The pattern by harm is just as uneven.



Figure 4: Attack success rate, by harm category. Share of attacks that succeeded, pooled across the four products.

Put these together, and the case for independent, repeated testing is plain. The protections are uneven between companies, invisible from outside, and unstable over time, and yet checking them is cheap. A single audit costs

little; what takes real resourcing is doing it continuously, across a fast-moving market, the standing capacity a regulator has to be built to have. For now the means are within reach and only the mandate is missing: no one with the authority to look is yet obliged to.

What this means

The audit did not find that AI chatbots are inherently unsafe. It found that some are already safe against the very attacks that defeated others, so this is not a hard limit of the technology: stronger safety in deployed products is possible today, because some companies have already achieved it. The variation we measured shows that protection is a choice, made differently by each company and disclosed to almost no one. That is the variation a duty regime exists to correct, and why voluntary safety cannot be relied on.

If safety is a choice, policy has to decide where in the system it gets made. Recall the three layers: the model, the developer system reached through the API, and the consumer app, each protecting a different group. Fixing the consumer app protects the people who use that app. Fixing the API protects every product built on top of it, the smaller services, companion apps, and agents that reach the model through that same door. Fixing the model protects everyone downstream at once. The further upstream the safeguard sits, the more of the market it covers. But there is a limit on how far upstream Canadian law can go: the model is trained abroad, by a handful of foreign companies, and its weights are not something a Canadian regulator can realistically reach. The fixes also carry different costs, the safety baked into Claude's model likely far more expensive than Meta's blocking classifier.

Canada can reach the two product layers, the developer system behind the app and the app itself. C-34 regulates the consumer app directly, and its functional definition of a chatbot service may well reach the developer system too. Those are the layers a Canadian duty can attach to, and they are the right ones (Coglianese and Crum, 2025).



Figure 5: The three layers of chatbot safety. The layers at which safety can sit: the model, the developer system (the API other products are built on), and the consumer app. The two product layers Canadian law can reach are marked, set apart from the model, which is trained abroad.

This is why C-34's choice to regulate the deployed system is likely right, and also why it cannot be the whole

answer. The person who opens ChatGPT or Gemini directly meets only the consumer app. For them, that layer is the one that counts, and the Act is correct to make the deployed product the unit it regulates. International practice points the same way: the OECD AI Principles (OECD 2023) and the EU AI Act (EU AI Act 2024, Art. 3) both centre on the deployed system a person uses, though the EU's newer rules also reach the model itself.

But the consumer app is not the only way these models reach Canadians. A small developer can build a companion app on the same model through its API, inheriting only whatever safety the company left switched on, which our audit shows can be very little. For that product's users, and there may be many, the protection that mattered was decided upstream, by a company they have never heard of, at a layer they cannot see. A duty that reaches only the four largest apps would miss them entirely.

For the user of an app the model-maker deploys itself, like ChatGPT, it makes no difference which layer holds the safety. Claude is safe because of its model and Meta because of its product, and the user is protected either way.

But pushing safety upstream carries costs. It gives the companies building on a model less room to tailor their own safeguards, it reaches enterprise users and not only the public, and depending on implementation it could weigh on open-source model developers. Placing the duty on the consumer app does not guarantee compliance everywhere, but it is a pragmatic balance between cost and the protection users actually receive.

What to do

C-34 has done the hard part. It brings chatbots into the law, defines them well, and writes duties that match how they cause harm. What remains is to make those duties bite, and the audit points to four things that will decide whether they do.

First, set the duties to outcomes, not paperwork. This answers the question the bill leaves open: what counts as "adequate" is settled not in advance but by what a product can be shown to do, measured against how it actually behaves under realistic, adversarial use, the kind of test we ran, not against the existence of a policy document. A safety plan never checked against results is the self-regulation cycle all over again: a company announces its commitments, the pressure lifts, and nothing is confirmed. The regulator should define "adequate" as a standard of demonstrated performance (Eder, 2024).

Second, give the regulator the power to look. The Act creates a Digital Safety Commission but does not let it test a deployed product directly. It should. Everything in this brief came from outside the companies, cheaply, using methods a regulator could run on a standing basis. A duty no one is empowered to check is a duty in name only. The Commission needs a clear mandate to audit regulated systems, repeatedly, and to publish what it finds (Raji et al., 2022).

Third, decide where the duties sit, weighing the trade-off set out above. The consumer app is the pragmatic anchor, the layer users actually meet and the one C-34 already reaches. The open question is how far to extend the duties to the developer system behind it: doing so would cover the third-party products that inherit weak safety, at a cost to implementation flexibility and to open-source developers. That trade-off should be made deliberately, not by default.

Fourth, build a regulator with the capacity to do this. The Commission is the part of the framework most easily underbuilt, and an underbuilt regulator is worse than none, because it absorbs the political demand for oversight while delivering little of it. Auditing a fast-moving market of AI products, on top of the social-media

mandate the Act already assigns, takes standing technical capacity, the people who understand these systems, and the budget to keep pace. That means resourcing it on the scale of peers like the United Kingdom's Ofcom and Australia's eSafety Commissioner, with an in-house team that can run its own audits.

None of this is an argument against AI, or against these products. Safety is achievable now, in deployed systems, at low cost; what has been missing is a requirement to achieve it and an authority to confirm it has been met. Canadians will adopt these tools, and benefit from them, to the degree they can trust them, and trust is something governance produces, not something a market delivers on its own. C-34 has put the duties on the books. Whether they protect chatbot users now depends on the regulations that define them and the regulator built to enforce them.

This memo accompanies "Online Harms AI Audit", a Media Ecosystem Observatory Technical Brief, June 2026.

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